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COMMENTARIES

DANIEL

T.

MURPHY*

The Restatement (Third)'s Human Rights
Provisions: Nothing New, But Very Welcome
The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States contains
three sections specifically dealing with the international law of human rights.
Section 701 sets forth the source of a nation state's obligation to respect
human rights:
§ 701. Obligation to Respect Human Rights
A state is obligated to respect the human rights of persons subject to its
jurisdiction
(a) that it has undertaken to respect by international agreement;
(b) that states generally are bound to respect as a matter of customary
international law (§ 702); and
(c) that it is required to respect under general principles of law common to
the major legal systems of the world. 1
Section 701(b)'s obligation to respect certain human rights as a matter of
customary international law is amplified by section 702, which lists the customary international law human rights and sets out the circumstances in which they
are violated.
§ 702. Customary International Law of Human Rights
A state violates international law if, as a matter of state policy, it practices,
encourages, or condones
*Associate Dean and Professor of Law, The T.C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond, Virginia.
1. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 701 (1986)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].

918

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)

genocide,
slavery or slave trade,
the murder or causing the disappearance of individuals,
torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment,
prolonged arbitrary detention,
systematic racial discrimination, or
a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized
human rights. 2
Lastly, in section 703 the remedies available to nation states and individuals in
the event of a state's breach of its human rights obligations as stated in sections
701 and 702, are set forth.
§ 703. Remedies of Violation of Human Rights Obligations
(1) A state party to an international human rights agreement has, as against
any other state party violating the agreement, the remedies generally available
for violation of an international agreement, as well as any special remedies
provided by the agreement.
(2) Any state may pursue international remedies against any other state for
a violation of the customary international law of human rights (§ 702).
(3) An individual victim of a violation of a human rights agreement may
pursue any remedy provided
by that agreement or by another applicable in3
ternational agreement.
These three sections are contained in Chapter One of Part VII of the Restatement (Third), which is titled "Protection of Persons (Natural and Juridical)."
Chapter Two, the other chapter in this Part, treats "Injury to Nationals of Other
States." That chapter is dominated by section 712, dealing with state responsibility for economic injury to nationals of other states, which is perhaps one of the
more controversial provisions of the Restatement (Third). It certainly was one of
the most contentious during the debates on the Restatement (Third). 4 Chapter
Two contains, however, in addition, a fourth human rights provision that reinforces the obligations in Chapter One. Section 711 provides in part:
§ 711. State Responsibility for Injury to Nationals of Other States
A state is responsible under international law for injury to a national of
another state caused by an official act or omission that violates
(a) a human right that, under § 701, a state is obligated to respect for all
persons subject to its authority . .. .5

2. Id. § 702.
3. Id. § 703.
4. See generally Clagett, Protection of Foreign Investment Under the Revised Restatement, 25
VA. J. INT'L L. 73 (1984); Clagett, The Treatment of Economic Injury to Aliens in the Revised
Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, 22 INT'L LAW. 35 (1988); Houck, Restatement of the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States (Revised): Issues and Resolutions, 20 INT'L LAW. 1361 (1986);
Note Expropriation in the Restatement (Revised), 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 176 (1984).
5.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 711.
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By the terms of the human rights provisions in section 701 a state is "obligated
to respect the human rights of persons subject to its jurisdiction . . . . Section
71 l(a) reiterates the notion that a state has an obligation to respect certain human
rights. That section's obligation runs to all persons "subject to [the state's]
authority .
7
'...The introductory portion of section 711, of course, only sets
forth a separate violation of international law if the state fails in its human rights
obligations with respect to nonnationals.
Several preliminary observations are warranted regarding these provisions.
The first is simply a celebration of the fact that human rights provisions are
contained in the Restatement (Third). Their inclusion is a testament, if indeed
further testament is necessary, to the heightened consciousness regarding fundamental human rights and the necessity for their protection that has occurred
during the twenty-five or so years since the prior restatement. 8 Inclusion of this
important topic is a significant step for the protection of human rights. Its
treatment is also significant for the Restatement (Third); because of these provisions, the Restatement (Third) is a more authoritative and credible work than
it might otherwise have been.
Second, it is important to appreciate that the human rights provisions of the
Restatement (Third) are statements of principles of international law as they
would be applied by the United States and other nation states and international
organizations. They are not restatements of the domestic laws of the United
States in the narrower sense. 9 This fact must be borne in mind when considering,

6. Id. § 701 (emphasis added).
7. Id. § 711. The use of the term "jurisdiction" in § 701 and "authority" in § 711 probably
is not intended to be of significance. In fact, the term "authority" is perhaps a better one. The term
"jurisdiction" is used in Part IV of the Restatement (Third) in the sense of jurisdiction to prescribe
and enforce its laws and to adjudicate (§§ 402-416). Nothing in Part IV or elsewhere states that this
use of the term "jurisdiction" is limited to Part IV. In the human rights context a state's international
law obligation is not only to avoid adoption and enforcement of laws that violate human rights norms,
but under some circumstances to bear responsibility for conduct of its officers or agents. Given the
special use of the word "jurisdiction" in the Restatement (Third), the word "authority" may capture
this broader responsibility in the human rights context better than the word "jurisdiction."
8. The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law contained no human rights provisions. It acknowledged in a Comment that the theory had been advanced that international law obligated a state
to protect basic human rights of all persons and that the doctrine of state protection of aliens is one
aspect of that general responsibility. RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 165 comment b (1965). But the Restatement itself looked the other way and articulated
rules of state responsibility to aliens independent of any obligation regarding human rights. It took
the position that the question of "whether international law imposes any obligations with respect to
the treatment by a state of its own nationals is beyond the scope of [this] Restatement.
... Id.
9. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) Introduction at 3, 3-5; id. § 101. Admittedly this statement glosses
over the important question of international law as part of the law of the United States. See infra notes
37-46 and accompanying text. However, in contrast, there are a number of provisions in the
Restatement (Third) that are intended as restatements of the domestic law of the United States having
a substantial significance for the foreign relations of the United States or having other substantial
international consequences. See, e.g. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 112-115 (interpretation and application of international law), §§ 204-205 (recognition of states), § 212 (citizenship and nationality),
WINTER 1990

920

THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER

in particular, the specific subsections of section 702; it explains some of the
frustration with the scope of that section.'o
Finally, as is apparent from a reading of these provisions, they are not extreme
statements. If anything they are a conservative articulation-not in the sense of
political ideology-but a narrow, noncontroversial statement of human rights
norms, probably supported in what they say by an overwhelming majority of
authorities. "
In the Introductory Note to Part VII, the Reporters explain the different international law underpinnings of the two portions of this Part-the traditional law
of state responsibility for injury to aliens and the contemporary human rights law.
Under the former, injury to alien persons (either to their person or property) may
constitute an offense to the state of nationality for which it may seek redress
under international law. Absent international agreement, however, no international law right would accrue to the individual, and no international redress
would be available to him or her.
Human rights law is said to have developed in the aftermath of the Second
World War. It embodies the notions that individuals have some rights in their
societies, which the state should respect, and that a state's treatment of its own
nationals is not only a matter of its own concern, but is a proper subject of
international concern. ' 2 The United Nations Charter is a reflection and source of
§ 302 (authority

to make international agreements),

§ 314 (reservations

of international agreements),

§ 326 (authority to interpret international agreements), 88 415-416, 422 (application of certain
principles of jurisdiction), § 433 (external measures in aid of enforcement of criminal law), § 442
(requests for disclosure), § 443 (act of state), §§ 457-460 (immunity from jurisdiction to adjudicate), § 472 (service of process), § 474 (obtaining evidence), § 478 (international extradition procedure), §§ 481-486 (foreign judgments), §§ 721-722 (individual rights), § 823 (judgments on
obligations in foreign currency), § 907 (private remedies for violation of international law).
10. See infra notes 19-28 and accompanying text.
11. Professor Louis Henkin, the Chief Reporter for Restatement (Third) indicated during discussion of §8 702 and 703 that § 702 was intended to be a consensus statement with which everyone
could agree. 62 ALl PROCEEDINGS 543 (1985).
Indeed these human rights provisions were not the subject of vigorous disagreement during the
floor discussions of Restatement (Third). They were among the sections presented at the annual
meetings of the ALl in 1982 and 1985. Probably not more than an hour was spent in floor discussion
and debate of them. See, 59 ALl PROCEEDINGS 204-28 (1982); 62 ALl PROCEEDINGS 543-44 (1985).
12. See generally L. HENKIN, THE RIGHTS OF MAN TODAY (1978); H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1968); M. McDOUGAL, H. LASSWELL & L. CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS
AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1980); A.H. ROBERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2d ed. 1982); L. SOHN &
T. BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1973); INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INJURIES TO ALIENS (R. Lillich ed. 1983); HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (T. Meron ed. 1984); Henkin, InternationalHuman Rights as "Rights," I CARDOZO L.

REV. 425 (1979); Higgins, Conceptual Thinking about the Individual in InternationalLaw, 24 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 11 (1978); Sohn, The New InternationalLaw: Protection of the Rights of Individuals
Rather than States, 22 AM. U.L. REV. 1 (1982).
Although not so stated in the Introduction, contemporary human rights law has as another of its
underpinnings the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. See I. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 338-42 (1st ed. 1963); 1. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNAVOL. 24, NO. 4
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as a goal, the promotion of respect for and observance
this concern. It contains,
13
of human rights.
This brief backdrop in the Introductory Note explains the international law
grounding of the obligation to respect human rights contained in section 701. The
sources of this obligation, as set forth in the three subsections of section 701,
international agreements, customary law, and general principles of law common
to the major legal systems of the world, 14 are straightforward and noncontroversial.
Section 702 lists six human rights norms that exist as matters of customary
international law and sets out the parameters on section 701(b)'s obligation to
observe human rights as a matter of customary international law. Nation states
may be obliged on the international level to observe human rights as a matter of
international agreement or customary law. Hence nonsignatory states do have an
international obligation to observe certain human rights, an obligation based on
customary international law.
The introductory portion of section 702 contemplates an intense level of
activity on the part of the state, however, before any of the practices can be said
to be violations of the customary international law of human rights. The state, as
a matter of state policy, must practice, encourage, or condone the abuse. Thus
the practice must exist as a matter of the state's official policy, affecting its own
citizens or aliens, before there can be a violation under section 702.15 In contrast,
a state may be responsible for injury to aliens under the doctrine of state responsibility embodied in sections 711-713 for the conduct of an officer within the6
scope of his or her authority that is in fact contrary to the states's official policy.'
TIONAL LAW

565 (3d ed. 1979);

HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS

(R. Lillich

ed. 1973); Franck & Rodley, After Bangladesh: The Law of HumanitarianIntervention by Military
Force, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 275 (1973).
13. U.N. CHARTER, arts. 1, para. 3; 55-56; see also Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
G.A. Res. 217, 3 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); International Covenant on Civil and
PoliticalRights and the InternationalCovenant on Economic, Social and CulturalRights, G.A. Res.
2200, U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967).
14. General principles of law common to a variety of legal systems are a source of international
law generally. Hence they are certainly a possible source of international human rights law. Much
should not be made of this as a separate source of human rights norms. Comment b to § 701
acknowledges that as of 1986 all human rights norms seem to be contained in agreements or
customary law, and that it cannot be said that any norms exist separately as general principles of law
common to various legal systems. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 701 comment b.
15. Id. § 702 comment b.
16. Id. §§ 711-713. The example was cited during the floor discussion of § 702 of torture
practiced by a sheriff in one of the states of the United States. The United States might be liable to
the victim's state of nationality for violation of § 711 or under the terms of an international agreement. But such an act of torture would not be a violation of § 702's prohibition of torture because
it was not performed as a matter of state policy. 59 ALl PROCEEDINGS 205 (1982). Of course the
obligation of a signatory state to observe specified human rights will be governed, as to the other
signatories, by the terms of the agreement. The agreement need not require "state policy" before a
violation can occur. See, e.g., Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, and the Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave

WINTER 1990
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As stated in section 702, the abuses that constitute customary international law
human rights violations, regardless of whether the object of the abuse is a
national or an alien, are only six: genocide; slavery or slave trade; the murder or
causing disappearance of individuals; torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; prolonged arbitrary detention; and systematic racial
discrimination. This certainly is a safe list. It contains, as noted in Comment a,
only those human rights "whose status as customary law is generally accepted
.. . and whose scope and content are generally agreed. ' 1 7 In Comments d
through i to section 702 each of these abuses is separately treated, the elements
of each are articulated, and the broad acceptance of each as a human right
18
protected by international agreement and state practice is demonstrated.
Such discussion and controversy regarding section 702 as there was during
debates of it centered not around the abuses listed, but, quite expectedly, on the
abuses not listed. Specifically, discrimination on the basis of gender or religion
and the right to hold property are not included on the list.
In the drafting of section 702 the Reporters faced a difficult task. It was most
important that the Restatement (Third) treat human rights matters and that such
treatment go beyond a recitation of the protection of human rights through
international agreement. It was important that a statement be included to the
effect that human rights are a matter of customary international law and thus are
binding on states that are not signatories to various bilateral and multilateral
agreements. Yet it was equally important for the credibility of the Restatement
(Third) that the section not boldly hold out certain rights, which in some parts of
the world community are not protected, as having attained the status of customary law rights.
It is on this point that the status of section 702 as a statement of international
law is important. Frustration was expressed that prohibition on gender or religious discrimination was not included among the list of customary international
law human rights norms.' 9 From a U.S. perspective, and indeed from that of
most of the West, these are fundamental protected human rights. They are all
covered in the Universal Declaration, and they are the subject of treaty protection
and supported by extensive state practice. Yet at the same time there is contrary
state practice in important portions of the world community.
The Restatement (Third)'s balance between the need to treat some rights as
matters of customary international law and the need to narrowly draw these rights
Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, Sept. 7, 1956, 18 U.S.T. 3201, T.I.A.S. No.
6418, 266 U.N.T.S. 3, neither of which requires that the prohibited conduct be the consequence of
a state policy in order for a violation to occur.
See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 207(c) and comments c & d, regarding attribution to a state of

conduct resulting from action or inaction by an organ, agency, official, employee, or other agent of
a government acting within the scope of authority or under color of authority.
17. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 702 comment a.

18. Id. comments d-i. For further expansion on these points, see also, id. reporters' notes 3-7.
19. See 59 ALl PROCEEDINGS 208-27 (1982); 62 ALl PROCEEDINGS 541-44 (1985).
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is contained in section 702(g) and the last portion of Comment a to section 702.
Section 702(g) lists as a separate violation of customary international law a state
policy that practices, encourages, or condones "a consistent pattern of gross
violation of internationally recognized human rights. ' 20 Comment a amplifies
this clause by noting that the list of customary international law human rights
contained in section 702(a) through (f) is not a closed list, nor is it necessarily
a complete list. The Comment thus asserts that other human rights norms may
achieve the status of customary international law in the future, and it implies that
indeed there may be some others that have already achieved that status.
While section 702(g) and Comment a provide the possibility of expansion of
the list of customary international law human rights norms, they have injected
some confusion and uncertainty into the question of what human rights can
become protected as customary international law. They also create differences in
status among customary international law human rights.
First, a substantially more intense level of activity is necessary before abuses
of these unlisted human rights can be considered to be breaches of customary
international law. Section 702(g) requires that there be "consistent pattern" of
"gross" violation of these unlisted human rights before a violation of customary
international law occurs. Neither of these showings is required for the six enumerated abuses.
For the six human rights listed, section 702 requires only that the state as a
matter of state policy practice, encourage, or condone the abuse. Apparently, no
actual implementation of a concerted policy of violation is necessary. An announced policy of genocide or of degrading treatment, even if not carried out, is
probably sufficient to constitute a violation of customary international law.21
Such a state policy certainly would encourage and condone the abuse. Yet for the
unlisted abuses there must be not only a state policy, but a state policy that results
in a "consistent pattern" of "gross" violation. A state policy that results in
isolated or "non-gross" incidents of abuse of these unlisted human rights is not
sufficient to constitute a violation of section 702.
While the need for a separate showing of a "consistent pattern" of abuse is
clear, the requirement of a separate showing of "gross" violation has been
extremely muddled, if not largely voided, by a subsequent Comment. Comment
m to section 702 first explains that the abuses listed in clauses (a) through (f) are
violations of customary international law even if the practice is not consistent or
part of a pattern provided that such abuses are inherently "gross." It then repeats
the elements of section 702(g), noting that abuses of unlisted human rights can
become violations of customary international law only if there is a "consistent

20. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 702 (g).

21. Comment b takes this point further. It notes that international law requires affirmative action
to outlaw genocide and slavery. A state is said to be responsible under § 702 if it fails to prohibit these
activities or to enforce the prohibition. Id. comment b.
WINTER 1990
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pattern of gross violations." A definition of "gross" is given. A violation is said
to be "gross" if it is "particularly shocking because of the importance of the
' 22
right or the gravity of the violation.
Comment m then substantially undercuts the need for any separate showing of
"grossness," with one possible glaring exception. The Comment states that
while all of the rights set forth in the Universal Declaration and protected by the
covenants are internationally protected, some are "fundamental and intrinsic to
human dignity." 23 Abuses of those rights, if engaged in as part of a state policy
and consistent pattern, may be deemed "gross" ipso facto. The Comment then
lists a variety of such practices. 24 Curiously, gender discrimination is not among
those listed. Consequently, it appears that a showing of gross violation is not
required in order to make out a violation of customary international law with
respect to, for example, freedom of movement or invasion of privacy. But
practices of gender discrimination can rise to the level of customary international
25
law violation only on a showing of gross violation.
Another difference between the rights listed in section 702(a) through (f) and
the other human rights norms, even those that may, by virtue of section 702(g),
rise to the level of customary international law, is that only the listed rights are
said to be such basic rights as to constitute preemptory norms of international
law. Hence, any agreement abridging them is void. 26
Section 702(g) and Comment a leave the status of gender and religious discrimination and the right to property as customary international law rights in a
very ambiguous position. Comment a opines that some human rights not listed
in (a) through (f) may have already achieved that status and that some others may
in the future. It then refers to Comments j, k, and 1, which deal with religious
discrimination, the right to property, and gender discrimination, respectively.
This causes one to wonder if perhaps these rights are included as customary
international law rights after all.
Comment j concludes by stating that a strong case can be made that systematic
religious discrimination, as a matter of state policy, is a violation of customary

22. Id. comment m.
23. Id.
24. These abuses include: systematic harassment; invasions of privacy of the home; arbitrary
arrest and detention (even if not prolonged); denial of fair trial in criminal cases; grossly disproportionate punishment; denial of freedom to leave a country; denial of the right to return to one's country;
mass uprooting of a country's population; denial of freedom of conscience and religion; denial of
personality before the law; denial of basic privacy such as the right to marry and raise a family; and
invidious racial or religious discrimination. Id.
25. In fairness, Comment m notes that the rights for which an abuse may be deemed gross
include the rights listed in supra note 24. The Comment does not limit this more favorable treatment
only to the rights listed, nor does it state that in all instances abuse of those rights automatically will
be deemed gross. However, given the prominent prohibition on gender discrimination in the Universal Declaration and the covenants, as well as the concern expressed about its inclusion in the list
of customary international law human rights, its omission is surprising.
26. Id. comment n.
VOL. 24, NO. 4
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international law.27 In contrast Comment k notes that although the Universal
Declaration includes the right to own and not be deprived of property, there is
wide disagreement among states as to the scope and content of such a right. This
disagreement weighs against inclusion of any right to property as a customary
international law right.
The Restatement (Third)'s position on gender discrimination is somewhat
between that on religious discrimination, which Comment j strongly suggests,
but does not commit, exists as a customary law human right, and that on property, for which Comment k suggests no customary right presently exists. Comment I acknowledges that prohibitions on sex discrimination are provided for in
the Universal Declaration and the covenants. The principal multilateral convention on sex discrimination 28 has been ratified by more than ninety states, and the
freedom is supported in domestic law of many states. The Comment notes that
there is conflicting state practice and that gender discrimination is practiced in a
number of states. It concludes, nevertheless, that freedom from such discrimination in many matters may be a principle of customary law. No indication is
given as to what such matters are. The status of gender discrimination, as a
matter of customary law, is thus left in a state of tantalizing indefiniteness.
The articulation in section 703 of remedies available for violation of sections
701 and 702's human rights obligations is very conservative. Essentially, three
types of remedies are stated. Under section 703(1) a state party to an international agreement has, as against another state party violating the agreement, any
remedies provided for in the agreement, as well as those remedies generally
existing for violations of international agreements. The customary international
law human rights are rights erga omnes. 29 Consequently, any state, not only the
state of the victim's nationality, may pursue, by reason of section 703(2), international remedies available for violations of customary international law human
rights. 3 0 By reason of section 703(3), an individual victim of a violation of
human rights protected by sections 701 or 702 alas has available only such
remedy as is provided by the agreement protecting that right or by another
international agreement.
The Achilles' heel of individual enforcement of human rights is readily apparent from this remedies section. While states, including the state of nationality,
may seek redress under section 703(1) or (2), the avenues whereby an individual
can seek redress are very limited.3 ' Section 703(3) states that an individual's
27. The Comment notes that religious discrimination is treated the same as racial discrimination
in the U.N. Charter and the covenants as well as in the constitutions and law of many states. Id.
comment j.

28. Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women, G.A. Res.
34/180, U.N. Doc. A/34/46 (1978).
29. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 702 comment o.
30. For a list of remedies, see id. § 703 comment a.
31. Certain multilateral conventions conventions contain sophisticated procedures for review of
individual petitions and determination of violations. See the right of petition in the European and
WINTER 1990
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international law recourse in the event of violation of a protected human right is
only that offered by some international agreement.
Section 703(3) limits individual recourse in two ways. First, it provides an
individual remedy only for violations of human rights that are protected by an
agreement. No individual recourse is stated for violations of customary international law human rights. Second, the only available remedy is that provided in
the agreement protecting the right or in another agreement.
Perhaps the best that can be said about section 703(3)'s statement of individual
remedies is that it very starkly sets out the exasperating situation confronting an
individual attempting to redress a violation of internationally protected human
rights. Surely the question of individual remedies for human rights abuses is one
of the most frustrating aspects of human rights law.32 In its human right chapter
the Restatement (Third) has effectively taken a very modest position on individual redress. Section 703(3) may be an unduly gloomy statement of available
remedies; 33 and it is certainly a position not borne out in other parts of the
Restatement.
In contrast, Chapter Two of the Restatement (Third) states an individual's
remedies more generously. Section 711 provides that a state is responsible under
international law for injury to a national of another state that is caused by an
official act violating a human right that the state is obliged to respect by reason
of section 701. This section incorporates much of sections 701 and 702; but
breaches of section 711 constitute a separate international law violation, if the
individual victim is an alien. Thus there are two layers of protection for aliens,
one under Chapter One's human rights
provisions and the other under Chapter
34
Two's state responsibility provisions.

American human rights conventions. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, art. 25; American Convention on Human
Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, art. 44.
32. See infra notes 37-46 and accompanying text.
33. But see infra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
34. The RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 711 requires much less intense state involvement in order for
a violation to take place. Isolated acts of abuse by a state officer can constitute a violation of this
human rights provision if the victim is an alien even though such conduct or neglect is not a part of,
or is contrary to, state policy. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
Whether or not the ambit of protection differs between §§ 703 and 711 is not clear. Assume a state
officer discriminates against an alien on the basis of race or subjects an alien to cruel and inhuman
treatment while incarcerated. Such conduct is not a violation of § 701 unless it is a matter of state
policy, even if known by higher authorities. By § 711 that state is responsible for injury to an alien
caused by an official act violating a human right that a state is obliged to respect under § 701. At first
reading it appears that the state officer's conduct would violate § 711. However, there is some
uncertainty as to what is the human right that the state is obliged to respect under § 71 l(a). Is it
freedom from racial discrimination or cruel and inhuman treatment or only freedom from state
policies of racial discrimination and cruel and inhuman conduct?
Comment b to § 702 states that human rights violations are only a violation of customary international law if they are practiced as state policy. It notes that a different rule exists with respect to
state responsibility for injury to aliens under § 711. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 702 comment b. The
VOL. 24, NO. 4
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Section 713 sets out the remedies for violations of section 711. The remedies
section 713 affords the state of nationality are much the same as those afforded
by section 703-such remedies as are generally available between states for
violations of international law. For individuals, however, the avenues of recourse
under section 713 are more broadly stated than those provided in section 703. By
reason of section 713(2) an alien injured by a violation of section 711 may pursue
any remedy provided by (i) international agreement between the injuring state
703(3)), (ii) the law of the
and the state of nationality (this is similar to section
35
injuring state, or (iii) the law of any other state.
Chapter Two is based on the doctrine of state responsibility. That body of
international law includes the notion that violations of its precepts give rise to a
claim by the state of nationality against the injuring state. An international law
remedy generally is not afforded the individual, other than as may be provided
by international agreement. Section 713(2), however, lists several potential avenues of redress that are open to injured individuals. The discussion of these
avenues of individual redress in the Comments and Reporters' Notes to section
713(2) is focused on remedies for breach of contract rights or for other economic
injuries such as expropriation. The section does not discuss recourse to these
avenues for violation of human rights. Nevertheless section 713(2), by its terms,
clearly applies in the human rights context.
It is interesting and somewhat ironic that Chapter Two, which is based on the
doctrine of state responsibility and which focuses on economic injury to alien natural
and legal persons, is more generous in its statement of possible individual remedies
than is the human rights chapter. Section 703, the basic human rights remedies section, is devoid of any provisions comparable to section 713(2)(b) and (c).
Subsections (b) and (c) of section 713(2) are, of course, somewhat illusory.
They do not require a state to provide any redress for individuals; they merely
difficulty is that § 711 (a) imposes responsibility for violation of human rights, which under § 701 a
state is obliged to respect. Id. § 711. Section 701's inclusion of violations of customary international
law of human rights in § 702 would not include the conduct mentioned because it is not engaged in
as a matter of state policy.
It is probably the intent to afford broader treatment under § 711, but to do so the human rights
abuses must be read apart from the requirements of a violation of customary international law.
35. Section 713 reads in its entirety as follows:
§ 713. Remedies for Injury to Nationals of Other States
(1) A state whose national has suffered injury under § 711 or § 712 has, as against the
state responsible for the injury, the remedies generally available between states for violation
of customary law, § 902, as well as any special remedies provided by any international
agreement applicable between the two states.
(2) A person of foreign nationality injured by a violation of § 711 or § 712 may pursue
any remedy provided by
(a) international agreement between the person's state of nationality and the state
responsible for the injury;
(b) the law of the state responsible for the injury;
(c) the law of another state; or
(d) agreement between the person injured and the state responsible for the injury.
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state that an individual may pursue any remedy provided by the law of the
injuring state or the law of any other state, including, presumably, the state of
nationality. The existence of any such remedy is not required. 36 Given the
innocuousness of section 713(2)(b) and (c), it is striking that section 703 provides no parallel set of provisions.
Several U.S. cases have dealt with the issue of providing an individual remedy
in instances of abuse of internationally protected human rights. These cases have
37
reached very different conclusions. In the now famous Filartigav. Pena-Irala
case the Second Circuit upheld the entertainment of jurisdiction by a federal
district court over a tort claim brought by Paraguayan nationals against the
Paraguayan government official alleged to have tortured to death their brother
and son. The case was brought under the Alien Tort Statute, 38 which confers
jurisdiction over civil actions brought by aliens for tortious conduct committed
39
"inviolation of the law of nations.''
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic40 involved a suit by victims of a terrorist
attack on an Israeli bus against the state alleged to have sponsored the attack.
The Circuit Court for the District of Columbia upheld the district court's dismissal of the complaint on the grounds, among others, that the Alien Tort Statute
does not cover conduct unless the customary international law principle or treaty
provision on which the cause of action is based contemplates an individual
41
remedy.
The recent Supreme Court case of Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. severely undercuts effective use of the Alien Tort Statute as a basis
of subject matter jurisdiction cases brought against foreign states.4 2 In Amerada

36. Failure to provide a remedy called for by an international agreement referred to in § 713(2)(a)
or the inadequacy of such a remedy may constitute a separate denial of justice. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) § 713 comment i.
37. 630 F.2d 876 (2d.Cir. 1980).
38. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1988).
39. Id. On remand the district court awarded the plaintiff actual and punitive damages, Filartiga
v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). Other cases upholding jurisdiction under the Alien
Tort Statute in the human rights context include Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D.
Cal. 1987), aff'd on reh'g, 694 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Cal. 1988); Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet

Socialist Republics, 623 F. Supp. 246 (D.D.C. 1985); Sinderman deBlake v. Republic of Argentina,
No. CV-82-1772 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 1984) (LEXIS, Genfed library); Letelier v. Republic of Chile,
488 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C. 1980).
40. 517 F. Supp. 542 (D.D.C. 1981), aff'd, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C.Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470

U.S. 1003 (1985).
41. Three different rationales were used toaffirm the district
court's ruling inTel-Oren. Judge
Edwards refused toextend the Filartigaprinciple to nonstate actors such as the PLO.Judge Robb
disposed of the case as nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine. Judge Bork determined
that the Alien Tort Statute did not create subject matter jurisdiction; but it allowed a court to take
jurisdiction of the case only when the customary international law principle contemplates an individual remedy. See also Handel v. Artukovic, 601 F. Supp. 1421 (C.D. Cal. 1985).

42. 109 S. Ct. 683 (1989).
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Hess the Supreme Court held that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 4 3 is the
44
sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over foreign states.
The Restatement (Third) strongly supports the proposition that customary
international law is part of the law of the United States and is to be applied by
our courts, state and federal, as part of federal common law.4 5 Yet on this critical
issue of individual recourse for violations of customary international law of
human rights,4 6 the Restatement (Third) has failed to take a position. The
43. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a), 1391 (f), 1441(d), 1602-11 (1988).
44. The Court held that 28 U.S.C. § 1604 bars state and federal courts from exercising jurisdiction when a state is entitled to immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), and
§ 1330 (a) confers jurisdiction when the foreign state is not entitled to immunity. 109 S. Ct. at 688.
In this case two Liberian corporations sued the Argentine Republic in federal district court to
recover in tort for damages to their vessels allegedly caused by Argentine armed forces in violation
of international law during the Falklands crisis. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, ruling that the suits were barred by the FSIA. Amerada Hess Shipping
Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 638 F. Supp. 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). A divided panel of the Second
Circuit reversed, holding that FSIA was not meant to "eliminate remedies in United States courts for
violations of international law." Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421,
426 (2d Cir. 1987). See Note, Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic: Denying Sovereign Immunity to Violators of InternationalLaw, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 1109 (1989)
The Supreme Court opinion does not involve human rights. However, it effectively precludes suits
against foreign states based on the Alien Tort Statute unless the conduct fits within one of the
exceptions to immunity set forth in the FSIA. Conduct constituting an abuse of human rights, with
the possible exception of deprivation of property, does not readily fit within the exceptions to
immunity contained in the FSIA. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1988).
For an argument that the FSIA does not preclude suits against foreign states in human rights cases,
see Paust, Draft Brief Concerning Claims to ForeignSovereign Immunity and Human Rights: Nonimmunity for Violations of International Law under the FSIA, 8 Hous. J. INT'L L. 49 (1985) and the
numerous authorities cited therein. See also Belsky, Merva & Roht-Arriaza, Implied Waiver Under
the FSIA: A Proposed Exception to Immunity for Violations of Peremptory Norms of International
Law, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 365 (1989).
Filartiga was a suit brought by the sister and father of a man tortured to death in Paraguay against
a Paraguayan citizen, the former Inspector General of Police in Asuncion, Paraguay. The state of
Paraguay wds not a defendant in the case, and the state of Paraguay was found not to have ratified
the defendant's conduct. Filartiga, 577 F. Supp. at 862; see also Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 889.
Whether the Supreme Court opinion in Amerada Hess means that a court could not entertain
jurisdiction in a case like Filartiga is less clear. The issue is whether individuals are entitled to
protection under the FSIA. Individuals are not within the definition of a "foreign state" or its
"agencies or instrumentalities" for purposes of the FSIA. 28 U.S.C. § 1603 (1988). There appears
to be little case law on the issue of derivative immunity for individuals. When the suit against the
person is really a suit against the state, immunity has been told to exist. Philippines v. Marcos, 806
F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1986). See generally J. DELLAPENNA, SUING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AND THEIR
CORPORATIONS (1988) and in particular § 1.8 thereof. If the suit is really against the individual,
especially when the individual is acting beyond his or her authority, immunity may not attach. Id. If
immunity under the FSIA does not attach, the opinion in Amerada Hess is not controlling, and it
might be possible for the suit to proceed under the Alien Tort Statute.
45. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) introductory note to pt. I, ch. 2; id. § Ill. At "federal common law" such
principles are supreme over state law and are superseded only by a federal statute or treaty provision. See,
Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1555 (1984).
46.

See generally R. FALK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER

(1964); Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789: A Badge of Honor, 83 AM. J.
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Reporters' Notes to section 703 discuss the Filartigaand Tel-Oren cases, but
express no opinion on the issue. 47

The omission from section 703 of provisions similar to section 713(2)(b) and
(c) is all the more surprising because the Restatement (Third) does not take the
position that such recourse in human rights cases is not available or is inappropriate. Quite the contrary. At the end of the Restatement (Third) is a chapter
dealing with remedies generally. There, in section 906, 48 is a provision very
similar to section 713. Section 906 permits a person injured by a state's violation
of an international obligation to bring a claim against the injuring state in the
courts or tribunals of that state or in the courts or tribunals of either the state of
nationality or a third state. Like section 713(2)(b) and (c) this section does not
require an effective domestic law remedy. It also circumscribes any such remedy
by the limitations of international law, such as sovereign immunity 49 or appropriate jurisdictional basis.
The Restatement (Third) thus acknowledges the possibility of individual enforcement of human rights claims in both sections 713 and 906. A reference to section 906
is even made in Comment c to section 703. The omission from section 703 of provisions like those in section 713(2)(b) and (c) means that section 703 understates the
avenues of possible individual recourse in the human fights context.
Despite these concerns regarding unstated customary international law human
rights in section 702 and the status of individual remedies in section 703, the
Restatement (Third)'s set of human rights provisions is a most welcome addition
to human fights law. The chapter does not break new ground and is probably very
traditional. Yet its inclusion as a separate chapter on a par with the treatment
given the classic doctrine of state responsibility is a significant statement about
the importance of this subject in the latter part of the twentieth century.
INT'L L. 461 (1989); Lillich, The ProperRole of Domestic Courts in the InternationalLegal Order,
II VA. J. INT'L L. 9 (1970); Klein, A Theory for the Application of the CustomaryInternationalLaw
of Human Rights by Domestic Courts, 13 YALE J. INT'L L. 332 (1988); Paust, On Human Rights: The
Use of Human Rights Precepts in U.S. History and the Right to an Effective Remedy in Domestic
Courts, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 543 (1989); Paust, Human Rights and the Ninth Amendment: A New
Form of Guarantee, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 231 (1975); Randall, Federal Questions and the Human
Rights Paradigm, 73 MINN. L. REV. 349 (1988); Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International

Law, 66 TEx. L. REV. 785 (1988); Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary International Law, 33
UCLA L. REV. 665 (1986); Note, Enforcing Customary International Law of Human Rights in
Federal Court, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 127 (1986); Note, Enforcing InternationalHuman Rights Law in
Federal Courts: The Alien Tort Statute and the Separation of Powers, 74 GEO. L.J. 163 (1985).
47. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 703 reporters' note 7.

48. § 906. Private Remedies for Violation of International Law
A private person, whether natural or juridical, injured by a violation of international
obligation by a state, may bring a claim against that state or assert that violation as a defense
(a) in a competent international forum when the state has consented to the jurisdiction of
the forum with respect to such private claims;
(b) in a court or other tribunal of that state pursuant to its law; or
(c) in a court or other tribunal of the injured person's state of nationality or of a third
state, pursuant to the law of such state, subject to limitations under international law.
49. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
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